LİTERATÜR TARAMASI: ETNİK ÇIKAR GRUPLARININ AMERİKAN DIŞ POLITIKASI ÜZERİNDEKİ ROLÜ*

A LITERATURE REVIEW: THE ROLE OF ETHNIC INTEREST GROUPS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Dr. Durmuş Alper ÇAMLİBEL
Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü
Visiting Faculty in the Department of Criminal Justice
California State University San Bernardino

Özet


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Abstract

Ethnic interest groups usually strive to influence foreign and domestic policies of a country which they live in and they frequently try to move forward the interest of their ethnic kin through the ethnic lobbies. Since the 1970s, ethnic interest groups, like other interest groups have increasingly become active in U.S. foreign policy and various groups including Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Cubans have sought to impact U.S. foreign policy toward their kin states. In the past thirty years, a number of books have been published on the influence of ethnic interest groups on U.S. foreign policy. However, until recently, the U.S. foreign policy literature has not deeply examined changing dynamics of ethnic groups in the United States’ foreign policy process. In addition, there is increasing debate in the literature on the role of ethnic interest groups on U.S. foreign policy. To see what extend do ethnic interest groups influence American foreign policy, this literature review has sought to find answers to these three critical research questions: How much access do ethnic interest groups have to U.S. Congress? What roles do ethnic interest groups play in the foreign policy process? Do ethnic interest groups actually influence foreign policy?

Key Words: United States, Foreign Policy, Ethnic Interest Groups, Diasporas, Lobbying

Introduction

Ethnic interest groups generally seek to impact foreign and domestic policies of a country and they frequently try to move forward the interest of their ethnic kin through the ethnic lobbies (Ambrosio, 2002a:2). According to Shain (1994-1995:811) many American diasporas, primarily migrants and their younger generations who are associated by attachments of origin, ethnicity, or nationality-feel a sense of affinity to their ancestral country or symbolic homeland. A number of scholars have examined the effect of the “ethnic lobby” on US foreign policy (Mathias, 1981; Shain, 1995; Smith, 2000). Many diasporas have gathered together under one common aim to indirectly influence their host countries by implementing certain policies toward their home countries. The foreign policy modifications may consist of increases in financial assistance and military support for the home country, or the recognition of the kin state as a sovereign country. Another option for diasporas is to directly impact ancestral homeland policies from outside of the county, for instance, by funding or subsidizing definite causes or expanding their concern on national identity and politics (Hägel and Peretz, 2005:473).

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1 Shain and Barth (2003:452) defines the diaspora as “a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control.” In this paper, I use the term ethnic groups, ethnic minority groups, ethnic interest groups, and diaspora interchangeably.
Since the 1970s, ethnic interest groups, like other interest groups have become increasingly active in U.S. foreign policy and various groups including Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Cubans have sought to impact U.S. foreign policy toward their kin states. During the 1970s and 1980s a great deal of scholarly researches were published on the activities of ethnic groups (Ambrosio, 2002a:2; Goldberg, 1990:2). A number of books have been published on this issue in the past thirty years. Two classic edited books Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (Said, 1981) and Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Ahrari, 1987) were published before the end of the Cold War. Abdul Aziz Said and Mohammed E. Ahrari have gathered studies on a variety of ethnic groups that analyze the influence of ethnicity on U.S. foreign policy. Neither of these books generalize other ethnic groups, but they illustrate role of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy successfully.

However, until recently, the U.S. foreign policy literature has not deeply examined changing dynamics of ethnic groups in the United States’ foreign policy process. According to Haney and Vanderbush (1999:341), there has been some consideration the role of societal groups on the U.S. foreign policy but this has not mainly concentrated on the role of interest groups in American foreign policy. 

By the end of the Cold War, government's focus on the security interest declined thus significant popular and intellectual concern focused on the role of ethnic interest groups on the U.S. foreign policy (Smith, 2000:65). Lentner (2006:176) and Uslaner (2004:127; 2007:318) argue that the dichotomy between “domestic policy” and “foreign policy” has already been eroded in practice. According to Uslaner (2004:126) the ethnic interest groups are the most important foreign policy entrepreneurs. A variety of the recent studies of U.S. foreign policy have focused on the role of ethnic interest groups (Shain, 1994-1995, 1995; Shain and Barth, 2003; Saideman, 2002a; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006). Haney and Vanderbush (1999:342) state that there has been concentration in the literature to the increase in ethnic interest group lobbying, however there is little agreement about the causes and the forms for the use of influence by these groups. According to Ambrosio (2002a:199-212), however, it was the post-Cold War period that allowed to a real increase in American multiculturalism. U.S. interests during this period were ambiguous, and the Congress had more power than the Executive Branch over policy-making. That power balance gave way to ethnic lobbying groups larger access to policy-makers and probable pressure in policy making. Since September 11, the roles changed the White House has become more powerful again on foreign policy making.

I have chosen this topic for literature review because of the increasing debate in the literature on the role of ethnic interest groups on U.S. foreign policy. In my analysis, I have drawn from ideas found in the existing literature on foreign policy, ethnicity and nationalism, international relations and American politics to try to get
broad insights of the foreign policy process as much as possible. To see what extend do ethnic interest groups influence American foreign policy, I have tried to find answers to these three vital questions: How much access do ethnic interest groups have to U.S. Congress? What roles do ethnic interest groups play in the foreign policy process? Do ethnic interest groups actually influence foreign policy?

In this study, I examine in the first section two dominant international relations schools—the realist theory of international relations and liberal theory of international relations—and their applications to the ethnic interest group's activity and foreign policy. The second part analyses ethnic interest groups influence on U.S. foreign policy. In this comparative section, I discuss the two contradictory views of supporters and opponents of ethnic interest group influence on U.S. foreign policy. I discuss in the third section the effectiveness of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy making process.

I. Ethnic Interest Groups and International Relations Theory
Interest groups who seek to influence U.S. foreign policy in accordance with the U.S. domestic interest. Those interest groups are formed by ethnic identity groups can be defined as ethnic interest groups (Ambrosio, 2002a:2). Therefore, David Truman views interest groups as "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes" (Truman, 1951: 33). Clough (1994: 82) indicates that ethnic interest groups differ from other conventional interest groups in that their primary objective is to alter the political situation and the living conditions in their kin-state. Therefore, ethnic interest groups play important role in existing international relations.

There are two dominant international relations schools of thought in the literature: Realist theory of international relations and liberal theory of international relations. This section briefly examines international relations theory and its applications in the ethnic interest group's activity and the foreign policy.

A. Realist Theory of International Relations
The realist theory of international relations argues that "the structure of a state's domestic politics has little or no impact on its foreign policy, especially on vital security issues" (Somin, 2006). Somin (2006) argues that all countries, "say realists", either cooperate defensively to reinforce their security, or seek to increase their defensive power.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq raised specific questions about the support the United States has long been giving to Israel. Wald and Williams (2006:206) claim that Jewish lobby pressure on the Middle East dispute has created a "suboptimal" foreign policy for the United States. According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006:30), who are amongst the foremost academic supporters of the realist theory of international relations, the U.S. national interest should be the most important aim of the U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. financial aid and political support to Israel have irritated Arab and Islamic community and
endangered U.S. national security. In their controversial article, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) argue that the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, rather than being shaped by American national interest, it has been shaped by Israeli lobby interest. The authors claim that interest groups other than Israeli interest groups have achieved to change U.S. foreign policy in directions they desired, however they achieved to alter U.S. foreign policy choices as much as the American national interest allowed, but in the same time persuading American constituents that U.S. national interest is principally matching with Israeli interest and policy preferences (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006:30).

Reactions to the Mearsheimer's and Walt's article came both from outside and inside of the academia. Chomsky (2006) asserts that the Israel lobby is essentially weak. Its lobbying activity can be successful when its interests match with the interests of the United States. Dershowitz severely criticizes Mearsheimer and Walt's study for being misleading, too cliché, so provocative, non-academic in its method, and biased (Dershowitz, 2006:6). Goldberg (2006) refers to logical errors and points out that “Walt and Mearsheimer are correct, after all, in arguing that discussion about Israel is hugely circumscribed in mainstream American media and politics.”

On the other hand Brzezinski (2006:63-64) praises Mearsheimer and Walt's article and he maintains the large amount of U.S. aid given to Israel distorts the peace process in the Middle East. In my opinion, the quality of these arguments were not sufficient to contribute to the literature of the influence of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy.

Somin (2006) asserts that the “Israel Lobby” argument is completely contrary to realist theory of international relations. If Mearsheimer’s and Walt’s realist theories are correct, then U.S. foreign policy towards Middle East has been “captured” by an influential ethnic lobby whose interests are against to U.S. national interests, as realists describe them. Somin (2006) maintains that the realist theory of international relations might be correct, and Mearsheimer's and Walt’s theses about the influence of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy might be logical however it is impossible that both to be correct at the same time.

**B. Liberal Theory of International Relations**

Unlike realist of international relations school which approaches states as unitary entities, liberal of international relations school views ethnic interest groups as entities within the international political system (Moravcsik, 2001:2-3).

The nature of societal actors, the nature of the state, and the nature of the international system are three main assumptions of liberal of international relations theory. These assumptions differentiate and exclude liberal of international relations theory from realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theories (Moravcsik, 2001:4,9).
Thanks to liberal theory researches on ethnic interest groups increased in the field of International Relations. By combining domestic affairs with the study of International Relations, the reciprocal dependence of the different stages of politics was accepted: “International and domestic are both ‘politics’. They can be understood by the same categories and concepts. The real question is not whether the two ‘levels’ are distinct, but how to study their unmistakable interaction” (Gourevitch 2002, 309). Robert Putnam’s (1988:433-436,456) well-known “two-level game” model focuses on the actors who link between the domestic and the international level of foreign-policy making. Putnam asserts that in order to succeed in international negotiations, governmental actors need to take decision compatible with the national interest.

Yossi Shain and Tamara Cofman (2002) add a new level -the ethnic interest groups- to Putnam’s “two-level game.” In their new “three-level game” model ethnic interest groups and the interests follow connection the two sides concerned in foreign policy activity – their homelands' government and their host lands' government.

During the last decade, transnational actors have reappeared as a significant issue of international relations theory and their influence have been accepted as an explanatory variable for various international developments (Hägel and Peretz, 2005:467-468). Diasporas are important actors in the interactions between home country and host country, and can be influenced by both. The agreement of interests between diasporas and states may be related to both domestic and foreign policies (Hägel and Peretz, 2005:472-473). Shain and Barth (2003:452-453) classify the diasporas in three categories in such transnational relations: core members, passive members, and active members. Passive actors become part of the foreign policy aims of — generally home country — countries without really being an actor themselves. Hägel and Peretz (2005:473) state that “the main instances of this role are nation-states’ ambitions to interfere in other states’ domestic or foreign policies on the ground of taking care of ‘their’ diaspora.” Shain and Barth conclude that "analysis of these cases belongs to the ‘standard’ IR scholarship dealing with foreign policy and international behavior" (2003:453).

II. Ethnic Group Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

I found in the literature two types of arguments on ethnic groups influence on U.S. foreign policy. Rubenzer and Redd (2005:5-7, 2006:4-8) named these two categories as proponents’ arguments and skeptics’ argument. According to Rubenzer and Redd (2005, 2006:4) proponents support the idea that ethnic or diasporic interests can impact the foreign policy decision making process. On the other hand, skeptics of diasporic influence who see ethnic interests as catalysts behind foreign policy decision making process.

The Supporters’ View

Supporters of ethnic interest group influence on U.S. foreign policy begin with three distinctive normative standards, the first normative standard is the U.S. immigration policy, consisting of legal residents, perceived as a danger to national
interests and security (Dominguez, 2006:3-4). A second normative standard is “liberal.” It stresses common arguments in a liberal democratic polity. Dominguez (2006:4) defines the third normative standard as “multiculturalist.” Multiculturalists assert that people with “distinctive life experiences” hold an exclusively insightful point of view and interests, which give them particular rights and consideration in the body of U.S. foreign policy toward their home country. Members of a diasporic interest group construct a “bridge” between the United States and their kin state. “The multiculturalist normative standard is privileged ethnic group knowledge, interest, and skill” (Dominguez, 2006:4).

Dominguez (2006:5) claims that the first two normative standards seek to influence U.S. policy toward its ancestral homeland if it "considers itself part of a political community with the people of the homeland" and "possesses human or financial resources to act across boundaries."

Glazer’s and Moynihan’s study sheds light on the argument of proponents. The authors claim that "without too much exaggeration it could be stated that the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy. This process regulates the ethnic composition of the American electorate. Foreign policy responds to that ethnic composition. It responds to other things as well, but probably first of all to the primal factor of ethnicity" (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975:23).

Samuel Huntington is the one of the most important supporters of the foreign policy and the ethnic interest groups argument. According to Huntington (1997:38), ethnic interest groups do not advance the American national interests but “the interests of people and entities outside the United States.” Regarding to the increasing numbers of immigrants coming to the U.S., he expects a growing political power of ethnic groups in foreign policy decision making processes. Said (1981:16-17) and Huntington (1997:40) contend that the national interest has been substituted by ethnic group interests. Although Huntington admits that ethnic interest and the national interest “may at times coincide” (Huntington, 1997: 40), he sees such coinciding as rather by chance. Shain (1994-1995:812) claims "the ability of U.S. diasporas to affect American foreign policy toward their homeland has grown (and is likely to expand) because of the greater complexity in distinguishing between America’s friends and foes after the collapse of communism."

In his book Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy Ahrari (1987) analyses that how pro-Israel groups limit the influence of pro-Arab groups throughout agenda setting and formulation phases of the policy processes. He compares the role of these two strongest and weakest actors in U.S. foreign policy from the public image stereotypes and the role of mass media aspects. In spite of Israel lobby’s prevalence on the politics and media, Ahrari concludes that the most essential factor of Israeli lobby groups’
success stems from the congruence of their interests with the United States and Israeli strategic objectives (Ahrari, 1987: xviii,1-24).

Smith (2000:86-87) asserts that the structure of American politics enables immigrants and ethnic societies access to decision making process. He argues that “the chief feature of American politics to keep in mind here is that relative to other democracies (although perhaps more like certain multiparty parliamentary systems) the American state is comparatively lacking in autonomy because it is highly penetrated by interest groups that are capable of making their agenda that of the government."

In the literature prominent scholars argue that after the Cold War, the American society witnessed the crucial role of ethnic groups in the U.S. foreign policy process (Shain, 1995:69; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:341; Smith, 2000:65 and Ambrosio, 2002a:7-9). Rubenzer and Redd (2006:4-5) state that the "end of the Cold War era and the existence of political pluralism, coupled with the lack of a unifying political cause or threat, increases the probability that ethnic identity groups will enjoy increased success in shaping U.S. foreign policy."

Garrett (1981:105) finds in his study that "Eastern European ethnic groups have been largely absent from a position of influence in U.S. foreign policy does not mean, however, that they have not at certain times been perceived by the Washington establishment as potentially powerful and important." The Israeli lobby, for instance, has long been recognized as having rejection over U.S. policy toward the Middle East and is usually perceived as the most influential ethnic lobby group in the United States.

The latest empirical studies prove the increasing influence of ethnic groups on foreign policy. David Davis and William Moore (1997) analyze the relationship between transnational ethnic alliances and the international interactions of states using the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB), the Minorities at Risk dataset, Polity II, Correlates of War, and the Penn World Tables, they performed a dyadic analysis and find a moderate correlation between transnational ethnic alliances and foreign intervention. Peterson (2004:39) corrects Davis’s and Moore’s methodology and found the correlation to be much stronger. The results support findings by Saideman (2002b:46-47) that suggest that ethnic ties have an important impact of foreign policy.

In their case study on the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Haney and Vanderbush (1999:357) find that an ethnic lobby’s influence path is reciprocal. They conclude their study by stating that "the heart of understanding CANF’s power in the 1980s is recognizing the mutual relationships and power-sharing it enjoys with the government and the way the Executive welcomed this."

The suggested hypothesis within the existing literature gives the impression that ethnic interest groups are both more concerned with foreign politics (particularly those concerning to ethnic relations abroad) and more likely those concerns motivate them to vote (Rubenzer and Redd, 2006:8).
**The Opponents’ View**

Opponents of ethnic interest groups influence inclined to initiate their argument by restraining the possible capacity of diasporic control. Analyzing the impact of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on President Reagan’s decision to sell AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, Bard² (1987:62) finds that it did not affect the decision of President. He states that a number of dynamics affected the process of foreign policy decision making: not only the balance of lobbying clout between Israeli and Arab ethnic groups but also the overall balance of internal influence and predominantly the power of the executive. Spiegel (1987) contends that the impact of the AIPAC on American foreign policy toward Israel is insignificant compared to the ideological, political and religious tendencies of individual lobbyists. He presents an outstanding brief survey of the AIPAC, its organization, influence efforts from Truman through Reagan, and motives for its successes and failures. Like Ahrari (1987), Spiegel (1987:41) also examines the effectiveness of Arab lobbies. Both scholars find that the pro-Arab lobby has made significant benefits in last decade, however as Spiegel summaries, Arab-Americans are "still no match for American Jews." Regarding ethnic group influence, Spiegel contends that ethnic interest groups have less impact than other foreign policy determinants, and their "primary influence-when it exists-is on Congress and on public debate" (Spiegel, 1987:23).

Garrett (1978:305-306) argues that the structure of US foreign policy is quite exclusive and insular, the president inclines to control, and politicians are usually suspicious of obvious identity group activities to influence foreign policy.

Cohen (1973:104) finds slight support for the argument that ethnic interest groups are a main determining factor of U.S. foreign policy. He analyses the views of high ranking officials in the State Department and he states that the officials emphasize that they spend too much time to deal with ethnic society demands. Cohen contends that it "is hard to discover in these broad contacts much contemporary support for the view that ethnic groups exert a significant impact on American foreign policy." In his analysis Cohen notes the only exception is Jewish ethnic lobby toward Israel. Moore (2002:85) is also suspicious about the role of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy. He states that ethnic bonds influence foreign policy of a country, however he finds little proof that ethnic minority groups are specifically impacts the foreign policy of the United States.

In his study *The Influence of Hyphenated Americans*, Gerson argues that politicians try to exploit ethnic groups in the quest for political gains (Said 1981:vii). He contends

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that "instead of emerging as a progressive force, ethnic groups are assimilated to serve the international interest" (as cited in Said 1981:vii). He believes that ethnic groups have only a limited impact on the U.S. foreign policy making and their influence in foreign policy is exaggerated.

Franzblau’s (1997:24) study on particular cases illustrates that a number of factors constrains the influence of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy. He asserts that;

"an ethnic group may have success in the foreign policymaking process when the policy in question affects the homeland of the particular ethnic group, where the issue involved does not threaten U.S. national security, where there is no equally effective lobbying effort against the proposed policy, or where the proposed policy is within the mainstream of overall U.S. foreign policy" (Franzblau, 1997:24).

Overall, then, it is obvious that there is a basic disagreement in the literature between supporters and opponents of ethnic group influence. Supporters are inclined to accept that the form of the American political system, together with a considerable interest on the part of diasporic groups toward issues in the kin state, are contributing to influence. On the other hand, opponents argue that determinants of U.S. foreign policy are not limited with ethnic lobbies there are other more significant factors which influence U.S. foreign relations and also ethnic groups are not so focused on foreign affairs to start with (Rubenzer and Redd, 2006:8).

III. Effectiveness of Ethnic Groups
The argument about the influence of ethnic interest groups on U.S. foreign policy is not only limited with supporters and opponents debates. Ethnic interest groups are politically powerful groups and they seek to influence policy making process to alter policies and living conditions beyond their host country’s borders rather than to improve the economic interest of the host country (Clough, 1994:6). Although ethnic interest groups have become politically more active, it is hard to measure their influence on the U.S. foreign policy making. Therefore scholars seek to identify specific conditions for ethnic group success and effectiveness in U.S. foreign policy. I found in the literature 16 different criteria to measure the effectiveness of ethnic interest groups. The criteria most frequently argued generally fall in one of three groups: association with the ethnic group, the character of its massage, and its ability to access to the foreign policy making. The sources of ethnic interest group success are comprehensively examined by Patrick Haney and Walt Vanderbush in 1999. In their case study of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Haney and Vanderbush review the literature on ethnic lobbies for frequently projected explanations of their effectiveness. Many of the factors are intuitive, and among the most important, they cite (Haney and Vanderbush 1999: 344-346):

- The organizational strength of the ethnic community; "organizational unity, a professional lobbying apparatus that provides useful information, and financial resources" (344). In my researches this issue is cited frequently by case studies of AIPAC, for instance, as a reason why it stands apart from other lobbies concerned with
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (Ahrari, 1982:xv). Other effective ethnic lobbies, such as Cuban, Greek and Armenian lobbies, are also demonstrated as models (Huntington, 1997; Ambrosio, 2002b; Shain and Barth, 2003). Studies of other existing strategies, in addition to general interest group analyses, also identify this factor as significant (Said, 1981:1-19; Watanabe, 1984:47-74; Uslander, 2007),

- The cohesiveness, geographic distribution, and electoral turnout rate of the community; based on the group electoral implications (Said, 1981; Watanabe, 1984:47-74). The group should be numerically significant with political clout. Numerical significance in the context of minority groups often implies geographic concentration, combined with a propensity to vote in high numbers (Haney and Vanderbush 1999:344, Smith 2000:95-101). In addition to Haney’s and Vanderbush’s (1999) findings, Ambrosio (2002a:11) states that several of the ethnic identity groups concerned in the foreign policy process are focused on states abundant in congressional districts and electoral college votes: for instance, New York, New Jersey, California, Illinois and Florida all have a significant impact in ethnic interest group politics and together hold nearly a third of all members of Congress. Uslaner (2007:317) states that Israel ethnic lobbies in general place heavy electorate pressure on Congress which make either anti-Israel or pro-Arab statements. Tony Smith claims that, “ethnic money buys political influence” and “political influence solicits ethnic money” (Smith, 2000:108).

- The salience and resonance of the message that the community offers to policymakers on a particular issue; the ability to influence public opinion. Ethnic interest groups often use the ignorance of population in foreign policy for their own political benefit. In my literature review, I find other explanations of the salience and resonance of the message. In many cases, the ethnic interest groups are concerned with the typical American either does not know enough to shape an opinion or concerns so little that the issue has no important political influence with the wider population. Consequently, American policy can be excessively influenced by a committed diaspora without much fear of a public reaction (Ambrosio, 2002a:11-12). For example, during the Azeri-Armenian war, the Armenian diaspora consistently pressured the Congress in order to restrict U.S. direct foreign aid to Azerbaijan (Ambrosio, 2002b:25). Watanabe (1984:60) argues that "groups can increase their chance for success if they can cast their positions in terms of so-called oppositionless issues: issues around which there is little disagreement about the policy goals but significant disagreement about the choice of means to that goal." Uslaner (2007:318) asserts the Israel ethnic lobby benefits from the unpopularity of its pro-Arab opposition. He concludes that American public opinion expects the Castro regime to break up, however they are less confident about peace in the Middle East.
The “push on an open door” of a policy establishment; ethnic interest groups are more likely to be successful if they improve policies that the government already supports (Haney and Vanderbush 1999:345).

Mutually supportive relationship; Watanabe (1984:53) states that "while focusing primarily on efforts by organized ethnic groups to seek out supportive officials, we should not neglect the fact that many officials may, for their own purposes, aggressively court ethnic groups and encourage their activism."

The literature points, then, to a number of propositions about the reasons that seem to make some ethnic lobbies more successful than others. For example, the 1980s saw the appearance of the CANF as an important player in US-Cuba policy and as one of the most powerful groups of its category in White House (Haney and Vanderbush 1999:345).

The permeability to ethnic interest group influence. Haney and Vanderbush (1999:345) argue that, because overall Congress has more points of access and is more permeable than the executive, ethnic interest groups will tend to be successful when they make proposals on the subject that entails a congressional role. Spiegel (1987:23) and Bard (1987:54), who are opponents of ethnic groups interest influence in general, assert that the impact of ethnic lobbies that exists primarily in Congress and in public opinion is not "clear" and this interest has little influence on the result.

Ambrosio (2002a) adds Haney and Vanderbush's criteria to the strength of an organized opposition; perhaps from a rival ethnic lobby to the community's efforts. For instance, the Azeri-Armenian war over Nagorno-Karabagh did not engage only these two nations. Instead, the possible rapid increase of the economy derived from oil reserves in the Caspian Sea, the geopolitical significance of the Caucasus territory, Israel's progressive coalition with Turkey, and Turkey's kinship for Azerbaijan combined in the mid-1990s to generate a curious alliance "of oil companies, administration officials, Jewish-Americans and pro-Turkey lawmakers" with the aim of challenging the Armenian-American diaspora (Ambrosio, 2002a:12-13).

In addition to Haney's and Vanderbush's examination of effectiveness of ethnic interest groups, in his book's conclusion Mohammed E. Ahrari (1987:156-157) has suggested three criteria for ethnic group success in U.S. foreign policy. First, the ethnic interest group must lobby for a policy compatible with American strategic interests toward that ethnic group's homeland. Second, the diasporic population must be "assimilated" by its members yet preserve sufficient ethnic identification with the homeland so that this foreign policy concern induces people to pursue foreign policy goals affecting kin state. In addition, an advanced and professional lobbying is essential for success. Third, the ethnic interest groups should be homogenous. Ahrari named the third criterion as a "minor determinant" since for some ethnic groups it seems to be a source of harmony and solidity, but others it appears to generate no such affect (Ahrari, 1987:157).
Uslaner (2007: 304) adds Ahrari’s criteria three other new conditions. He states that the ethnic group’s strategies should gain strong public support. The ethnic lobbies should be large to exert political pressure. Finally, the diasporic group’s interest must be justifiable and legitimate.

Nevertheless, ethnic interest groups, in spite of their small sizes and in some cases political suppression, have an important role in impacting a country’s foreign policy. Many case studies show that smaller groups may actually put forth an excessively large pressure, sometimes greater than that presented by the majorities with which they live together peacefully. Saideman (2002a:93-94) claims that the majority dominates foreign policy, the fact that the minority groups exercise less influence compared to the majority groups, however, in some cases the minority influence on foreign policy more effective than majority influence. However it is hard to measure the ethnic interest groups effectiveness on U.S. foreign policy. Since the lobbying activities of ethnic groups are diverse in the literature, studies on the real influence of these efforts primarily create varied outcomes.

In their study Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth (2003:462-466) define elements affecting the effectiveness of ethnic interest group influence consisting of the degree of ethnic interest group motivation; different ethnic interest groups have, in different times and on different issues, varying degrees of motivation to influence their home country’s foreign policy.

The social-political nature of both the host country and the home country; if the host country’s foreign policy is significant to the home country, and the host country is amenable to the ethnic interest group’s activities to influence its foreign policy, then the ethnic interest group’s capacity to influence the home country’s foreign policy is increased. Similarly, if the host country is "permeable," and is amenable to the ethnic interest group’s effort, then the ability of the ethnic interest group to influence the home country’s foreign policy is increased (Shain and Barth 2003:463-465).

The strength relations (‘balance of power’) between the ethnic interest group and the home country; if the home country looks for ethnic interest group’s support, and the ethnic interest group is coalesced about the direction the home country’s foreign policy should take, then the capacity of the ethnic interest group to impact that direction is increased. The home country usually looks for financial support which ethnic interest group can provide to home country or political support ethnic interest group can mobilize in its host country. Finally, the authors assert that these elements are all interrelated (Shain and Barth 2003:465-466).

Rubenzer and Redd (2006:11) note that these criteria in the ethnic lobby literature can be extended. I agree with them since I find in the existing literature 16 criteria that shows me the tendency on the development of conditions for ethnic group
success and effectiveness in U.S. foreign policy are highly open to add new criteria. In my opinion adding a new criterion to existing literature is more likely situational. In other words, the U.S. foreign policy is susceptible to changes in the balance of power in the world, so changes in criteria are affected by the power politics in the world.

Conclusion

As one has seen in the literature like all interest groups, ethnic interest groups aim to influence U.S. foreign policy toward their home countries. In a broad sense, ethnic interest groups establish bridges between their home and host countries and they are able to change undemocratic practices of their home countries by influencing host countries’ foreign policies. The studies of the last twenty years on ethnic interest group influence in U.S. foreign policy are quite remarkable in both its research focus and its intellectual level.

This literature review is only a brief comprehensive analysis of the influence of ethnic interest groups on foreign policy. Rubenzer and Redd (2006:19-20) describe three elements for further research to establish a more inclusive and correct illustration of the effectiveness of ethnic group influence. First, the literature proposes that the method that ethnic group interests express their assertions has an influence on the decision-making procedure. For instance, the literature presents that diasporas that make their demands in democratic ways are expected to be more effective at impacting U.S. foreign policy (Bard, 1994; Shain, 1994-95 as cited in Rubenzer and Redd, 2006:19-20). However in the literature, I could not find an empirical study that examined this claim in a comprehensive case study.

Second, the literature suggests that in election campaigns ethnic interest groups often use their financial power to influence U.S. foreign policy to promote diasporic benefits. Rubenzer and Redd (2006:19-20) find that in the literature there is no research has thoroughly tested the relationship between ethnic interest groups’ “campaign contributions and congressional votes.”

Finally it is feasible that the formation of the ethnic group itself has an influence on congressional decision making process. Geva and Hanson (1999) claim that cultural resemblance with host countries plays an important role in cases where two or more ethnic groups contend for influence. Although in the ethnic group interest literature there is not enough information in this subject, it is commonly discussed that AIPAC is more successful in influencing U.S. foreign policy than any other ethnic lobbies. Because there is cultural resemblance between the Israel lobby and the U.S. congressmen.

REFERENCES

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